Tuesday, 29 January 2013

Week 4 Reading

Next week James Lancaster will introduce Francis Bacon. We shall be reading the sections dealing with ‘On the Nature of the Good and the Culture of the Mind’ from The Advancement of Learning. James recommends the version in The Major Works, ed. Brian Vickers, Oxford World Classics (Oxford, 2002), pp. 245-65. Note also the recent ‘Oxford Francis Bacon’ critical edition, IV, pp. 135-56. In an older Oxford edition (ed. W. A. Wright, 1868; my reprint is from 1963) this is Book 2, xx.4-xxii.17 (pp. 187-217).

You can also find it online at http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext04/adlr10h.htm (search for text starting with ‘The doctrine touching the platform or nature of good’, stopping at ‘XXIII. (1) Civil knowledge’).

Week 3. Montaigne on Adversity

Moving from Lipsius to Montaigne, it is interesting to note that Lipsius is said to have read Montaigne’s Essais in 1582 or 1583, just at the time he was composing De Constantia. He is even said to have encouraged Christopher Plantin to produce an edition. Lipsius praised Montaigne as a modern Thales in a letter to T. van Leeuwen written in May 1583 (Epist. Select. Cent. Prima Misc. (Antwerp, 1605) 43 = Iusti Lipsi Epistolae I (Brussels, 1978) 268). Montaigne returned the complement, describing Lipsius in the 1588 edition of the Essais as one of the most learned men alive (2.12). The pair corresponded around this time too. Three of Lipsius’s letters survive (Epist. Select. Cent. Secunda Misc. (Antwerp, 1605) 41, 55, 92 = Iusti Lipsi Epistolae III (Brussels, 1987) 626, 644, 711; all three are reprinted with a French translation in Michel Magnien, ‘Trois lettres de Lipse à Montaigne (1587[?]-1589)’, Montaigne Studies 16 (2004), 103-11).

(For the above I am in part indebted to Alan Martin Boase, The Fortunes of Montaigne: A History of the Essays in France, 1580-1669 (London, 1935), 19-20. See also Olivier Millet, ‘Dominicus Baudius lecteur de Montaigne ’, in Paul J. Smith and K. A. E. Enenkel, eds, Montaigne and the Low Countries (Leiden, 2007), 120, and note also Millet’s La Premiere reception des Essais de Montaigne (Paris, 1995), Magnien’s ‘Montaigne et Juste Lipse: une double méprise?’, in C. Mouchel, ed., Juste Lipse (1547–1606) en son temps (Paris, 1996), 423-52, and his ‘Aut sapiens, aut peregrinator: Montaigne vs. Lipse’, in M. Laureys, ed., The World of Justus Lipsius, A Contribution Towards his Intellectual Biography (Rome, 1998), 209-32.)

However, despite the admiration they shared for one another, it is striking how much Montaigne’s attitude towards fate and adversity differs from Lipsius’s. In Essai 3.10 (‘On Restraining Your Will’) a number of statements imply a distance between the two. For instance, Montaigne writes ‘to cure poverty of possessions is easy: poverty of soul, impossible’, which suggests a pessimism about the acquisition of virtue quite different from Lipsius’s ambitious therapeutic project. Montaigne goes on to encourage flight from public evils rather than developing the inner resources necessary to cope with them, let alone embrace them as potentially advantageous. He often describes a struggle between reason and desire that implies a complex psychology quite different from the Stoic model embraced by Lipsius that holds that desires and emotions are ultimately the product of rational judgements. Montaigne’s goal is to control his emotions, not eradicate them. While there are many Stoic resonances in what Montaigne has to say, and even a qualified alignment with Stoicism (‘What Stoics did from virtue I teach myself to do from temperament’), there seems to be a clear distance between his position and Lipsius’s.

Comparing Montaigne with Lipsius, one natural place to look is Montaigne’s Essai 1.12, entitled ‘On Constancy’. In stark contrast to Lipsius, public evils remain real evils for Montaigne, and the virtue of constancy enables us to bear these troubles patiently: ‘The role played by constancy consists chiefly in patiently bearing misfortunes for which there is no remedy’. Lipsius’s quite different strategy is to argue that so-called misfortunes or public evils are not only not really evil at all, but in fact benefit us, reflecting the fact that they ultimately derive from divine providence.

Others have commented on this difference. Paul Friedland has written ‘Although Montaigne and Lipsius read many of the same classical texts and, in fact, appear to have been admirers of each other, the conclusions that they drew with respect to the question of suffering […] could not have been more different’ (Seeing Justice Done: The Age of Spectacular Capital Punishment in France (Oxford, 2012), 151). On this topic at least Montaigne is the modern stoic (small ‘s’) while Lipsius remains a faithful follower of the ancient Stoics. While others might be able to embody Lipsius’s Stoic ideal, Montaigne seems unable to do so himself (‘Let us not attempt to follow such examples: we shall never manage it’). 

Tuesday, 22 January 2013

Week 3 Reading

In week 3 Alex Douglas will lead a session on Montaigne. Alex has suggested that we read two of the Essais: 'That the taste of good and evil things depends in large part on the opinion we have of them' and 'On restraining your will'. Alex recommends the online translations here and here, and the French text here and here.  

I think the online translation may be based on the first edition of the Essais; in translations of his final edition (e.g. Frame, Screech) these two essays are 1.14 and 3.10.  

Week 2. Lipsius on Misfortune


Last time we saw that Lipsius’s De Constantia is structured by a series of four arguments directed against ‘public evils’ (mala publica) and designed to help us cultivate the virtue of constantia. Those four arguments were that public evils are i) imposed on us by God (1.14), ii) the product of necessity (1.15-22), iii) in fact profitable or good for us (2.6-17), and iv) neither particularly grievous or unusual. Last time we focused on material from the second of these arguments, concerning the nature of fate. This time our focus is on the third argument, and its claim that ‘public’ evils’ are in fact profitable for us.

Lipsius’s argument involves three main claims (outlined at 2.8), namely that ‘public evils’ benefit us as exercise (exercendi), chastisement (castigandi), and punishment (puniendi). (At 2.11 he adds a fourth point in their favour: they are required for the balance and harmony of the world.) Adverse situations exercise the virtues of the good, they chastise and encourage the weak-willed, and they punish the bad. In each case they offer a genuine good, even if at first glance they may appear bad. Although this looks like a fairly traditional response to the ‘problem of evil’, in fact it draws heavily on Stoicism, in two slightly different ways. 

Stoic ‘Indifferents’ 

Firstly it draws on the Stoic theory of value, which claims that external objects and events are strictly speaking value neutral, or ‘indifferents’. Only virtue, conceived as an excellent mental state, has genuine positive value, and only its opposite, vice conceived as an irrational, confused mental state has genuine negative value. Consequently so-called ‘public evils’ ought not to be thought of as evil at all, but rather a matter of indifference. They might be examples of what the Stoics call ‘non-preferred indifferents’, better avoided if possible, but not bringers of any genuine harm.

However Lipsius’s argument concerning the benefits of public evils goes further than that. Anything that enables us to improve our virtuous state of mind will surely be something preferable. It won’t be good itself, for only virtue is good, but if it promotes virtue then surely it must be choice worthy, that is, a preferred indifferent, to be chosen wherever possible. Or perhaps we ought to put it even more strongly than that, for preferred indifferents – things such as wealth or good health – are things we might pursue so long as their pursuit doesn’t conflict with the cultivation of virtue, but if some things actively contribute to the cultivation of virtue then they are surely more choice worthy than mere preferred indifferents. Choosing those things that help maintain our nature qua rational beings will be a ‘proper function’. Indeed choosing those things knowing that they will help improve one’s virtue will make these choices even better: ‘perfect proper functions’.

The Stoic background to Lipsius’s discussion might lead us not merely to deny that ‘public evils’ are really evils after all but to go further and to embrace these apparent evils as in fact giving real benefit, contributing to our cultivation of virtue. As Lipsius puts it in 2.6, they bear “an inward fruit and commodity” (interno fructu commodisque).

Seneca on Providence

All of this is wonderfully elaborated with the finest rhetoric by Lipsius’s beloved Seneca in the latter’s De Providentia, in which Seneca tries to answer the question why it is that good people suffer misfortunes in a supposedly providentially ordered world. As one would expect, Seneca challenges the assumption standing behind the question: “nothing bad can happen to a good man […] adversity’s onslaughts are powerless to affect the spirit of a brave man” (Prov. 2.1). It is noteworthy that here Seneca continues to refer to ‘adversity’, just as Lipsius continues to refer to ‘public evils’ (at 2.6 Lipsius is explicit that they are actually good), even though both want to present these as beneficial. Seneca goes on to argue that these adverse events not only don’t affect the virtuous but are also genuinely positive for the rest of us too. We should approach any adversity we encounter in our lives as a ‘training exercise’. Like wrestlers who welcome strong opponents, we too ought to welcome the challenges that life throws at us as opportunities to develop our character. What we might be inclined to think of as ‘bad luck’ should instead be embraced as valuable experience, as something not only positive but also deliberately sent by divine providence.

As Seneca develops his thoughts about the positive nature of what we might ordinarily call adversity he suggests that it can have two distinct positive roles: it can train virtue and it can test virtue. Those of us who are a long way from having an excellent mental state (and that’s almost all of us, according the Stoics) ought to welcome adverse events as a form of training. I mentioned Seneca’s use of an analogy with wrestling but now he uses use the more graphic image of medical cautery. Poverty, hunger, or bereavement are all painful but necessary cures that will toughen us up and make us better prepared to cope with these same things in the future.

It might be objected here that if adversities such as poverty, hunger, and bereavement are not really bad at all, then why do we need to be trained to endure them? Surely we shouldn’t be thinking of these things as needing to be endured at all, if they cause us no genuine harm. That would certainly be true if we had mastered virtue, but while we are still imperfect, these sorts of events will continue to feel unwelcome for some time to come, and the sceptic will of course say that they will always feel unwelcome because they are genuine evils. But note that if one were to follow that sceptical line of thought then Seneca still has something useful to say: such adversities may well be genuine evils but if that is the case then all the more reason to train oneself to be able to bear them more effectively. The only serious training available is to suffer them first hand, so suffering them does have its benefits. This line of thought also features heavily in Lipsius.

As well as training the imperfect, these adverse events also test the perfect. Seneca quotes the Cynic philosopher Demetrius: “nothing seems to me more unhappy than the man who has no experience of adversity”, to which Seneca adds “for he has not been allowed to put himself to the test” (Prov. 3.3). (Lipsius borrows this quotation from Seneca in 2.8.) We only find out who we are and what we are made of when we are put to this sort of test. If we were never to experience any kind of bad luck in our lives then we would never know how we would respond. Only when faced with a real challenge do we find out who we really are, and that may be someone quite different from who we thought we were. In any case such adversities are an inevitable part of life. Given this, the real choice left to us is to decide whether to learn from such experiences or simply moan about them, Seneca suggests. As he puts it, “disaster is virtue’s opportunity” (Prov. 4.6: calamitas virtutis occasio est). As for those who have never faced disaster, “no one will know what you were capable of, not even you yourself” (Prov. 4.3).

So, Seneca suggests that truly great people will delight in adversity, treating it as both further training and an opportunity to show their true worth. If one is minded to believe in divine providence then, given these benefits of adversity, one might even see bad luck as a gift or blessing from the gods. We should think of such tests as compliments, a bit like the soldier who is selected by his commander for an especially difficult mission.

If this sounds a bit extreme, Seneca goes even further. Not only should we welcome what we might ordinarily call bad luck; we should also shun what we usually think of as good luck: “the greatest danger comes from excessive good fortune” (Prov. 4.10). The worst thing that can happen to us is to be blessed with a life of unending luxury, comfort, and wealth, for such a life would make one weak and lazy. But worst of all, the longer we experience a comfortable and easy life, the harder it will hit us when our luck finally changes, as it surely one day will.

In the light of this, the truly unlucky are those that have never experienced adversity. We ought not only to welcome what we ordinarily call bad luck but also be very wary of good luck. The traditional problem of evil that opens Seneca’s essay – why bad things happen if the universe is providentially ordered – simply vanishes, for those supposedly bad things are in fact of great service to us.

Lipsius on Misfortune

The discussion that Lipsius gives us in De Constantia clearly draws very heavily on Seneca here. (Note that the central problematic passage in Lipsius’s discussion of Stoic fate also comes from De Providentia, 5.8.) After outlining his three claims about the profitability of public evils (as exercise, chastisement, punishment), he adds a fourth at 2.11: that they are necessary to the harmony and balance of the world. Stepping behind the various examples, one of the underlying points that seems to be here is that destruction is the inevitable counterpart to generation. There is also a point about perspectivism here as well: one person’s crushing defeat is another’s glorious victory.

After these four points Lipsius turns to further objections: that events brought by providence often appear be unfair punishments (2.12-17). We have just seen that we ought not to think of these as punishments at all, but even so he continues to address the questions of i) why bad actions are not punished (immediately), ii) why the (apparently) innocent are sometimes punished, and iii) why punishments sometimes appear to be transferred (from one generation to the next; from one member of a group to the whole group). Although Lipsius offers various responses to these objections, the general thrust in this latter part of the discussion is that trying to grasp the details of the way in which events are providentially ordered is simply beyond us, and something we must accept on faith. But as I have already noted, if the arguments in the earlier part stand then this later discussion becomes superfluous, for adverse events are benefits, not punishments.

(Some of the comments on Seneca here are borrowed from an earlier short piece published in The Philosophers Magazine, called ‘Tough Luck’.)

Tuesday, 15 January 2013

Week 2 Reading

In week 2 we continue with Lipsius. We shall look at De Constantia 2.6-17, available in English in On Constancy, trans. J. Stradling, ed. J. Sellars (Exeter, 2006), 85-111. If you would like a PDF of these pages then write to me via john.sellars [at] kcl.ac.uk. You can also find it online at http://www.wku.edu/~jan.garrett/lipsius2.htm. As before, you can find the Latin text of De Constantia online here.

Week 1. Lipsius on Fate

The Four Philosophers
The Four Philosophers
Justus Lipsius (1547-1606) was a northern European Humanist, born in a village just outside Brussels, in what is now Belgium. He held a number of University posts, in Jena, Leiden, and Leuven, and his moves between these institutions involved changes in his professed faith that raised a few contemporary eyebrows. He was first and foremost a scholar of Latin literature, but with wide interests in all things Roman. He was prolific author, publishing with the famous printer Christopher Plantin of Antwerp, whose printing house survives as a museum. Lipsius often spent time in Antwerp with a group of intellectuals based there, including the brother of Peter Paul Rubens, Phillip Rubens. Rubens painted Lipsius a couple of times, most famously in ‘The Four Philosophers’ and later he would contribute engravings to editions of Lipsius’s works.

Lipsius’s most famous philosophical work is his De Constantia of 1584, a work in part inspired by Seneca’s De Constantia Sapientis. Around the same time he also wrote a work called Politica (1589), although wrote is perhaps too strong a word as it is modelled on a commonplace book, and takes large numbers of quotations from other authors, arranging them into the form of an argument. Its proto-Hobbesian thesis is that peace and order ought to take priority over individual freedom. This work, and Lipsius’s wider interests in politics, was in part inspired his reading of Tacitus, whose works he had edited in 1574. Lipsius seems to have read Tacitus as a political philosopher and Lipsius saw him as a natural companion to Seneca, for Tacitus often refers to Roman Stoics in his histories and so offers evidence of Roman Stoicism in practice.

Lipsius would also go on to edit the works of Seneca, completing the task right at the end of his life in 1605, the year before he died. The year before that, 1604, he published two other philosophical works, both devoted to Stoicism, his Manuductio, or Handbook of Stoic Philosophy, and his Physiologia Stoicorum, or Physics of the Stoics. Both of these works, which form the first modern attempt to offer a systematic account of Stoicism, were very much conceived as companion pieces to the edition of Seneca and were designed to help readers understand the philosophical background to Seneca.

Beyond these four more or less philosophical works, Lipsius also published studies of ancient literature, a work on ancient crucifixion, an illustrated study of Roman amphitheatres, and a history of libraries. He also published his correspondence, emulating his beloved Seneca and earlier Humanists such as Petrarch and Ficino.

De Constantia

As I have noted, Lipsius’s De Constantia was inspired in part by Seneca’s De Constantia Sapientis. At least that is where he probably found inspiration for his title. The content of De Constantia is closer in its concerns to Seneca’s De Providentia. It was conceived in part as a philosophical antidote to what Lipsius calls the ‘public evils’ then afflicting northern Europe in the form of religious wars that were particularly disruptive in the Low Countries. The work takes the form of a dialogue in two books, set ten years in the past, between a younger Lipsius and Charles de Langhe, or Langius, who was Canon of Liège. Langius takes the role of the elder wiser figure, dispensing advice and guidance to the younger Lipsius. This naturally raises questions about the attribution of ideas, for although Lipsius is the author of the whole piece, the majority of the substantial claims made in the dialogue are not made by the character Lipsius.

The work has a very clear structure. It begins by describing the virtue of constantia or steadfastness and goes on to offer four arguments or remedies against public evils that will help us to cultivate this virtue, all outlined in 1.13 and then developed throughout the rest of the work. The four arguments are that public evils are i) imposed on us by God (1.14), ii) the product of necessity (1.15-22), iii) in fact profitable or good for us (2.6-17), and iv) neither particularly grievous or unusual.

Stoic Fate

It is during the course of the second of these arguments that Lipsius offers a discussion of the Stoic theory of fate. This comes as part of an attempt to get clear about the nature of fate that involves drawing distinctions between four different conceptions outlined at 1.17: mathematical, natural, violent, and true. The argument is superficially clear but it may also have deeper complexities. The superficial thrust of the argument is to claim that Stoic fate is an example of violent fate, and a Christian ought not to accept any version of violent fate. So, if we want to reconcile commitments to Stoicism and Christianity then we must modify Stoic fate on four points (outlined at 1.20) in order to bring it into harmony with true fate. The Stoic ‘errors’ are i) to make God subject to fate, ii) they deny the possibility of miracles, iii) they deny all contingency, and iv) they deny free will. On these four points Stoicism must be modified.

A common reading of all this suggests that Lipsius is proposing a Christianized revision of Stoic fate and that this Christianized version of Stoicism lays the foundation for what has come to be known as Neostoicism, a new philosophical position distinct from Stoicism proper due to these revisions. Thus Neostocis are not proper Stoics. Depending on your point of view that might be bad if what you are expecting is proper Stoicism, or good if you value originality and innovation.

However it is possible to raise doubts about this way of reading what is going on here. The first point to note is that all of this is put into the mouth of Langius, not Lipsius himself. The second, more significant, point is that the differences that Langius points to between Stoic fate and true fate don’t really stand up. Not only that, there are various hints in the text that suggest that Lipsius the author was well aware of this fact. These hints suggest that while others might present Stoic fate as an instance of what he calls violent fate, in fact Lipsius was well aware that this was an unfair caricature of the Stoic position. If this is right, and Lipsius was aware of this, then he was also aware that in fact Stoic fate didn’t need amending at all. If that’s the case then why did he not simply come out and say that Stoic fate has been misrepresented by others? Why did not defend it explicitly?

As it happens that’s what he did do twenty years later when he revisited the question of Stoic fate in his Physiologia Stoicorum. Many commentators have not unreasonably assumed that Lipsius shifted his view in the intervening period, perhaps due to a better grasp of Stoic philosophy, but if the hints do show that Lipsius was well aware of all this already in De Constantia then no real shift takes place. But that stills leaves the question of the complex and confusing presentation of Stoic fate in De Constantia.

(I have discussed some of this in more detail in my forthcoming paper ‘Stoic Fate in Justus Lipsius’s De Constantia and Physiologia Stoicorum’.)
 
Outline of Contents of De Constantia

Book One
1.1-3 Introductory: Lipsius travels to escape public evils. Langius says evils are the product of one’s opinions and in order to escape evils one must change one’s mind, not one’s location.
1.4-7 Constancy introduced. The antidote to the affections produced by public evils is Constancy. This is the product of Reason, in contrast to Inconstancy, which is the product of Opinion.
1.8-12 Three enemies of Constancy are Dissimulation (1.8-10), Piety (1.11), and Pity (1.12).
1.13 Four arguments outlined concerning the nature of public evils:
i) they are imposed by God (1.14);
ii) they are the product of Necessity (1.15-22);
iii) they are profitable to us (2.6-17);
iv) they are neither grievous nor unusual (2.18-26).
1.14 First argument: Public evils are imposed by God (i.e. the product of Providence).
1.15-22 Second argument: Public evils the product of Necessity (i.e. Fate/Destiny).
Four kinds of Fate (1.17):
i) Mathematical;
ii) Natural;
iii) Violent (all 1.18);
iv) True (1.19).
Four points on which True Fate differs from Stoic Violent Fate (1.20):
i) Stoic fate subordinates God to necessity
ii) Stoic fate proposes an eternal order of natural causes
iii) Stoic fate denies possibility / contingency
iv) Stoic fate inflicts a violent force on our will
Conclusion of the discussion of Fate (1.21-22).
Book Two
2.1-3 Interlude concerning Langius’ garden; not a place for Epicurean pleasure but rather for Stoic reflection.
2.4-5 Warning against merely discussing Constancy; one must become wise, not merely learned.
2.6-17 Third argument: public evils may be profitable (2.6-7). They are profitable in three ways: as exercises for the good (2.8), chastisement for the weak-willed (2.9), or punishment for the bad (2.10). A fourth reason added (2.11): necessary for the balance and harmony of the world. General objection (2.12): why are punishments unfair? Three specific objections answered: why are the evil not punished (2.13-15); why are the innocent punished (2.16); why are punishments transferred (2.17).
2.18-26 Fourth argument: public evils are neither grievous nor unusual. Proved by Reason (2.19). Proved by Comparison (2.20-26). Comparisons with wars, plagues, and cruelty from antiquity. What would be truly uncommon would be a human life completely devoid of all trouble.
2.27 Summary: Constancy can overcome sorrow but will require repeated training in order to transform one’s state of mind.

Wednesday, 9 January 2013

Week 1 Reading

For week 1 we shall read Lipsius's De Constantia 1.17-20, available in English in On Constancy, trans. J. Stradling, ed. J. Sellars (Exeter, 2006), 62-70. If you would like a PDF of these pages (and to receive further readings) then write to me via john.sellars [at] kcl.ac.uk. You can also find it online at http://www.wku.edu/~jan.garrett/lipsius1.htm

You can find the Latin text of De Constantia online here.

Thursday, 3 January 2013

Stoicism and Early Modern Philosophy Research Seminar

Welcome to the website for the Birkbeck / King's College London "Stoicism and Early Modern Philosophy" Research Seminar, organized by Alexander Douglas, Susan James, Minna Koivuniemi, and John Sellars. In Spring 2013 we shall run a research seminar / reading group on Mondays 2.00-4.00 at King's College London (Philosophy Building, Room 508). Texts will be circulated in advance. Each week the text will be introduced briefly, followed by discussion. All welcome. Further info and updates will be posted here in due course. 
 
Schedule

14 Jan - Lipsius I: On Fate (introduced by JS). Reading: De Constantia 1.17-20.
21 Jan - Lipsius II: On Misfortune (introduced by JS). Reading: De Constantia 2.6-17.
28 Jan - Montaigne (introduced by AD). Reading: Essais 1.14 & 3.10.
4 Feb - Bacon: On the Nature of the Good and the Culture of the Mind (introduced by James Lancaster). Reading: The Advancement of Learning, OFB IV, pp. 135-56.
11 Feb - Descartes I (introduced by MK). Reading: Descartes-Elisabeth Correspondence (D-E: 8 July 1644, D-E 18 May 1645, E-D 24 May 1645, D-E May or June 1645, E-D 22 June 1645, D-E June 1645, D-E 21 July 1645, D-E 4 Aug 1645, E-D 16 Aug 1645, D-E 18 Aug 1645, E-D Aug 1645, D-E 1 Sep 1645, E-D 13 Sep 1645, D-E 15 Sep 1645,E-D 30 Sep 1645, D-E 6 Oct 1645, E-D 28 Oct 1645, D-E 3 Nov 1645, E-D 30 Nov 1645, D-E Jan 1646, E-D 25 April 1646, D-E May 1646 A, D-E May 1646 B, D-E Nov 1646, E-D 29 Nov 1646, D-E Dec 1646, E-D 5 Dec 1647, D-E 31 Jan 1648, D-E 22 Feb 1649); Descartes-Queen Christina Correspondence (20 Nov 1647; D-Chanut 20 Nov 1647; D-Chanut 31 March 1649); cf. CSM III, p. 237 ff.
Reading Week
25 Feb - Descartes II: Generosite (introduced by SJ). Reading: Discourse on Method, Parts 1-3; Passions of the Soul, Part 3.
4 Mar - Spinoza I: Determinism (introduced by AD). Reading: Ethics I Appendix; II P49 (with Corollary and Scholium);
 Principles of Cartesian Philosophy Appendix: I, ch. 3; II, chs 8-9. 
11 Mar - Spinoza II: Passions (introduced by MK). Reading: Short Treatise II chs 1-7; Ethics III P1-P31; IV P1-P17. 
18 Mar - Cudworth: Fate and Free Will (introduced by JS). Reading: A Treatise of Freewill esp. chs 1-3, 9-10, 14, 18.
25 Mar - Shaftesbury: Living According to Nature (introduced by JS). Reading Askêmata ‘The End’ & ‘Good & Ill’ (Std Edn, pp. 126-39).